Louis Proyect: The Unrepentant Marxist

January 8, 2015

A response to a Jacobin article on Kobane

Filed under: Kurd,mechanical anti-imperialism,Syria — louisproyect @ 5:52 pm

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While it is understandable why the international left should offer the maximum solidarity to the Kurdish struggle centered in Kobane, a Jacobin article by Errol Babacan and Murat Çakır offered in that spirit and titled “The False Friends of Kobanê” does require some scrutiny. Published originally in Infobrief Türkei, it vehemently opposes outside intervention, particularly from Turkey. The article reflects a fairly widespread belief on the Turkish left that there was nothing of value in the Syrian uprising since President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was backing it. If it wasn’t enough that Erdoğan was intervening, he was implicitly intervening on behalf of the worst elements:

Given that IS militants have reportedly been crossing the Turkish-Syrian border with ease, and in the context of Turkey’s longstanding hostility to Kurdish interests, it was clear that such a plan would amount to the fox guarding the henhouse.

And as is so often the case with pro-Kobane material, there is a sharp distinction between the pure as the driven snow PYD—the Kurdish militia—and the sneaky Syrian rebels who apparently conspired to draw imperialism into the fray from the beginning:

The PYD had previously made known that its activities were independent of the wider Syrian opposition. When the latter began conferring with Turkey and, with Western support, took up arms against the Syrian government and started calling for foreign military intervention, the PYD spoke out against such outside intervention and stressed that a democratic Syria could only be the collective project of all Syrians.

If you click the link to “calling” above, you will be directed to an article in Jadaliyya.com by As`ad Abukhalil—the “Angry Arab”—that was written in 2012. My friendly advice to Errol Babacan and Murat Çakır, if they ever stumble across this article, and to Bhaskar Sunkara who surely will, is to avoid referencing the Angry Arab if they want to be taken seriously as analysts rather than cheap propagandists. The Angry Arab’s article is a long diatribe describing the war in Syria as an American-Israeli cabal and is just one brick in the edifice he has been constructing for the past four years to demonize the FSA. There are far better Baathist propagandists than him, like Nir Rosen or Joshua Landis. That is, if you want to be taken seriously.

Babacan and Çakır describe a virtual socialist utopia in Syria that was threatened by the imperialist-beseeching Syrian rebels:

Democratically decided price controls, a constitutional justice system, and free schooling in any student’s mother tongue are additional distinguishing features of Rojava’s egalitarian structures. Under exceedingly adverse conditions, the region has managed to sustain its people on the basis of self-organized production collectives.

At the outbreak of civil war in Syria, Rojava’s representatives did not merely reject outside military intervention. In negotiations with the Syrian opposition, they also argued for the autonomy of the Kurdish region in a possible future Syria. The Syrian opposition organized under the umbrella of the Syrian National Council categorically rejected both these stances.

Once again it would behoove the authors, and the editors at Jacobin, to look a bit more closely at these matters before drawing such a sharp distinction between good and evil, or black and white. As it turns out, it was not just between the Kurds and the SNC. There was another important player, namely the Baathist dictatorship in Damascus that decided to focus on destroying the FSA rather than the PYD just as it would also for Machiavellian purposes refrain from attacking ISIS.

As it turns out, the co-leader of the PYD had come around to the conclusion that Syria’s future and the preservation of the Baathist dictatorship were inextricably linked. That’s what ALMonitor reported in October 2013:

Salih Muslim, co-chairman of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), said a solution in Syria without President Bashar al-Assad is not easy. “A solution without Assad means the death of 2 million Alawites,” he said.

Muslim, who gave an exclusive interview in Rojava to Hilmi Hacioglu of the popular Turkish TV news program The 32nd Day, said his party wanted to participate in the Geneva meeting not as part of the Syrian National Coalition but as an independent Kurdish movement. Yet, some countries, including Turkey, were trying to block this.

Muslim said a solution without Assad would have been possible two years ago, but it was now impossible. “All Alawites now support Assad. Insisting on a solution without Assad means the death of 2 million Alawites in the country,” he added.

Asked if they were cooperating with the Assad regime, Muslim replied: “No, never. Whoever says this is disrespecting our martyr brothers. We have been fighting with the regime since the 2004 Kurdish uprising. We have nothing in common with them. They don’t recognize Kurdish identity. But others are worse than the regime.”

In terms of whether the PYD was collaborating with the Assad regime, there are different opinions on that as well. Here is one that departs from the socialist utopia narrative that came from Eva Savlesberg, a scholar responsible for the website http://www.kurdwatch.org, which reports on human rights abuses against the Syrian Kurds.:

For more than a year, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its People’s Defense Forces (YPG) have exercised state-like power in the Kurdish regions of Syria. Supported by Iran with weapons and ammunition moved through central Iraq, the PYD—a Syrian affiliate of Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—controls large parts of the border region between the Kurdish areas of Syria, Turkey and Iraq. Activists criticizing or not cooperating with the PYD have been abducted, tortured and sometimes killed. The PYD imposes taxes on gasoline, collects border fees and has established a system of courts. Since summer 2012, the Syrian regime has handed over the administration of an increasing number of cities and villages to the PYD. The fact that the PYD took over all the cities they now control without any significant fighting indicates that there was a deal between the regime and the PYD and PKK.

There are several reasons for the Syrian regime’s cooperation with the PYD. First, the PYD has, particularly in the second half of 2011 and the first half of 2012, violently suppressed dissident demonstrations on behalf of the regime, for example in Afrin. This allowed the Syrian army to concentrate on fights elsewhere and avoid having to open a second front against the Kurds, back then hesitant to join the revolt.

Second, since the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Islamist groups have started to operate in Kurdish areas, handing over control of those areas to the PYD means the YPG—not the Syrian army—is fighting the armed opposition there.

Finally, Syria is once again playing its Kurdish card against Turkey. In summer 2011, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) angered Damascus by siding with the opposition. Like his father before him, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is using the Kurds to apply pressure on Turkey. The AKP cannot afford—politically or militarily—for the PKK and PYD to establish a major stronghold in Syria.

So ironically as Bashar al-Assad was leveling Aleppo and Homs to the ground, two experiments in social/economic development were being conducted in Syria in relative safety—all because of deals struck with Damascus. ISIS was building its dungeon caliphate with its own medieval laws while the PYD was building something that was inspired by Murray Bookchin’s anarchist writings. While clearly Bookchin is more inspiring than ISIS barbarism, the most pressing need since 2011 has been unity among all people living in Syria for a republic based on equal rights rather than privilege protected by torture.

Turning now to the question of outside intervention, it is remarkable that an article so consumed with the need to demonize the FSA for supposedly being a tool of Israel and the USA will in the same breath motivate the need for more “effective” delivery of weapons to the PYG, the Kurdish militia in Kobane:

It is perhaps conceivable that the US had to react to public pressure, but other questions persist. Why weren’t more arms delivered directly to the people’s self-defense forces (YPG/YPJ)?

Maybe the authors should have submitted their article to Foreign Affairs rather than Jacobin if their intention was to make the case for a more effective arms delivery mechanism. And while they are at it, maybe they can make a pitch for the weapons-starved FSA that fought on behalf of the PYD, even after its co-leader accused them of virtually plotting the extermination of the Alawites as he rallied around Bashar al-Assad.

I would add that unlike Errol Babacan and Murat Çakır, the PYD sees the question of where it gets weapons or who bombs on its behalf as a tactical question, just as has been the case for most of the 20th century when the Irish and the Indians conspired to get weapons from German imperialism to use against the British Empire. For the pro-Assad left defying Russia, Iranian or Syrian policy goals became an act of class treachery. This is a debased “anti-imperialism” hardly worthy of the name.

On October 17, 2014 Business Insider described how the PYD and US-led warplanes worked closely together to smash ISIS:

US-led warplanes pummelled jihadists attacking the Syrian town of Kobani on Friday as the Pentagon said there was no imminent threat to Baghdad despite a wave of deadly bombings.

Six strikes hit Islamic State group positions close to the front line in the east of Kobani, taking advantage of new coordination with the town’s Kurdish defenders, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said.

In neighboring Iraq, sandstorms hampered the US-led air campaign against the jihadists, but despite recent advances west of Baghdad, IS is not poised for an assault on the capital, the Pentagon said.

The dawn strikes in Kobani came after US Central Command said American warplanes struck 14 times around the town on Wednesday and Thursday, including “successful” raids on 19 IS-held buildings.

“There is coordination between the Kurdish forces and the Americans,” Observatory director Rami Abdel Rahman told AFP.

“The Kurds are giving them the exact coordinates of where the fighting is.”

So what conclusions do we draw from all this? My position—put simply—is to oppose American intervention everywhere and anywhere. It does not have the right to function as the world’s policeman. More to the point, it has largely been lost on the “anti-imperialist” brigade that its actions in that capacity helped keep the filthy tyrant Bashar al-Assad in power largely by permitting his air force a free rein. In one of the most underreported stories of 2012, we learn how the USA blocked the shipments of weapons that could have turned the tide of war:

U.S. officials say they are most worried about Russian-designed Manpads provided to Libya making their way to Syria. The U.S. intensified efforts to track and collect man-portable missiles after the 2011 fall of the country’s longtime strongman leader, Moammar Gadhafi.

To keep control of the flow of weapons to the Syrian rebels, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar formed a joint operations room early this year in a covert project U.S. officials watched from afar.

The U.S. has limited its support of the rebels to communications equipment, logistics and intelligence. But U.S. officials have coordinated with the trio of countries sending arms and munitions to the rebels. The Pentagon and CIA ramped up their presence on Turkey’s southern border as the weapons began to flow to the rebels in two to three shipments every week.

In July, the U.S. effectively halted the delivery of at least 18 Manpads sourced from Libya, even as the rebels pleaded for more effective antiaircraft missiles to counter regime airstrikes in Aleppo, people familiar with that delivery said.

“We were told that we need to get our house in order on the ground, and that it wasn’t time yet,” said a rebel representative involved in the delivery.

Wall Street Journal, October 17, 2012

The slogan of a genuine anti-imperialist movement might have been “CIA out of Syria–Let the MANPAD’s in!”


  1. Good points. Its rather extraordinary that the authors can produce an historical sketch of the establishment of Rojava without mentioning the PYD’s relationship with the regime as a major factor in its birth. Their treatment of more recent developments is equally shallow: they write as if this is a mature regime which has tangible accomplishments to show to demonstrate its credentials. But in fact its all on paper – and how could it be otherwise: Rojava is less than a year old and its institutions are still in the process of being built. And there is something odd about the sequencing of its creation – first the autonomy of the 3 cantons was proclaimed; then their Constitution (Social Contract) was unveiled; and six months later the first elections were held. But that raises the question of who was making these early decisions. There is evidence that they were basically a series of PKK/PYD fiats. I’m all in favour of decisive action and there are undeniably a lot of positive elements in the Rojava programme, but its far to early to give uncritical support to the PYD. There are just too many unanswered questions around. By the way, I’d treat Kurdwatch with a generous pinch of salt – they are factionally aligned with the KDP and that colours their reporting considerably. But whatever the truth of their accusations, they show that there are deep political divisions in Rojava among the Kurds, let alone with the non-Kurdish population of the Cantons. – a fact never seems to be registered by the western enthusiasts for the Rojava project.

    Comment by magpie68 — January 9, 2015 @ 12:47 am

  2. This white paper from the International Crisis Group makes essentially the same points as the Kurdwatch.org author:

    Click to access 151-flight-of-icarus-the-pyd-s-precarious-rise-in-syria.pdf

    Comment by louisproyect — January 9, 2015 @ 1:11 am

  3. `So what conclusions do we draw from all this? My position—put simply—is to oppose American intervention everywhere and anywhere. It does not have the right to function as the world’s policeman. More to the point, it has largely been lost on the “anti-imperialist” brigade that its actions in that capacity helped keep the filthy tyrant Bashar al-Assad in power largely by permitting his air force a free rein. In one of the most underreported stories of 2012, we learn how the USA blocked the shipments of weapons that could have turned the tide of war:’

    That makes zero sense and is a betrayal of the whole article in the form of a sop to the bogus anti-imperialists. The same Stalinists and neo-Stalinists who opposed the Syrian National Democratic Revolution are now unabashedly calling for US intervention on the side of Assad. They have zero embarassment. In the Second World War they would have been the ones demanding the West open a second front and send equipment to the Soviets or help out the Spanish Revolution as if. There is no way we should be tieing our hands with made up Stalinist principles pushed by the likes of the openly pro-Putin/pacifist StWC alliance. We deal with matters on a case-by-case basis. There is no way I would have opposed the intervention that prevented Gadaffi from obliterating Bengazi for instance which was done for its own self-serving reasons but nevertheless objectively served the revolution. In fact on Syria our understanding, which was proved entirely correct, was that the West would definitely not intervene but would strand aside whilst Assad and the Islamists hacked their way through the population and we held to this line whilst the official movement protested a non-existent intervention for four years that meant that the left too stood aside and even cheer led this butchery. The counter-revolutionary left uses so-called anti-imperialism to oppose revolutionary movements when it suits them. They used it to turn their back on the Arab Spring with disatrous consequences.

    Comment by davidellis987 — January 9, 2015 @ 10:32 am

  4. Kurdwatch.org are paid liars for the US, EU and the Tehran and Washington-backed regimes in Baghdad and Erbil: http://kurdologie.de/funding/
    No huge surprise that the International Crisis Group sings the same tune, given they are paid by the same piper.
    Why do you continue discount the views of activists and academics who have visited Rojava who are not funded by imperialism and the Tehran and Washington-backed regimes in Baghdad and Erbil?
    Why do you consider the claims of the Kurdish left disproven by being merely contradicted by paid mouthpieces for imperialism, Baghdad and Erbil?

    Comment by Tony — January 9, 2015 @ 11:31 am

  5. Why do you consider the claims of the Kurdish left disproven by being merely contradicted by paid mouthpieces for imperialism, Baghdad and Erbil?

    Because I believe that the claims are largely correct, namely that the PYD is trying to create an alternative to the prevailing chaos using the writings of Murray Bookchin as a guide. But that is not the issue. The issue is how they gained such leeway. Plus, the authors are doing the same thing you have done–to use Rojova as a cudgel to attack the FSA. The very notion–to cite the Angry Arab as an impartial source on Syria.

    Comment by louisproyect — January 9, 2015 @ 1:57 pm

  6. @Tony. The practice of dismissing unwelcome news from sources because of the funding of their sponsors is an intellectual dead-end. HRW and ICG gather information in a professional way – their researchers are people with knowledge of the places they are working in and extensive local contacts; their reports are referenced, transparent and relatively balanced as to their sources That’s not to say they are without bias – but it only takes a little intellectual effort to identify what those are and to correct for them.
    If you read the ICG report (The Flight of Icarus) you’ll find an historical account of the rise of the PYD, of the way in which it took control in Rojava, and of the current situation in the region, based on systematic, interviews across the political spectrum. In places it is quite positive about the PYD’s conduct, in others critical. Where else are you going to obtain that? You can’t seriously replace it with the testimony of people who spend a few days in Rojava travelling in what looks very like a PYD bubble.

    I largely agree with you about Kurdwatch (although they don’t “merely contradict” PYD accounts) –not because of its funding, but because of the obvious political bias in its reporting. But even it has value as a barometer of the degree of political discord in Rojava – something that never seems to emerge during the PYD’s guided tours.

    As I said previously, we need to take the Rojava project seriously and give credit where it is due; but why are you so insistent on looking at this important initiative through rose-tinted spectacles and ignoring any difficult political questions arising from it?

    Comment by magpie68 — January 9, 2015 @ 6:51 pm

  7. @Louis I’m not so sure about the committment to Bookchin’s vision beyond the general concept of a federated solution to ethnic diversity (not that original). A recent report from a visiting Bookchinite describes Rojava as: “a system of popular self-government, based in neighborhood commune assemblies (comprising several hundred households each), which anyone may attend, and with power rising from the bottom up through elected deputies to the city and cantonal levels.”
    This makes it sound like some kind of early soviet system. But there is very little of this in the actual Rojava constitution. Some of it is rather vague, but where it is specific it reads pretty much like a standard liberal democratic set up. Obviously that in itself would be an achievment, but not quite what alll the hype has been suggesitng
    See: http://peaceinkurdistancampaign.com/resources/rojava/charter-of-the-social-contract/

    Comment by magpie68 — January 9, 2015 @ 8:56 pm

  8. First, the correct things in this article; yes the PYD has struck deals with the regime. Ties between the PKK and the Assad regime go back to the 1980s. Yes the YPG has coordinated with US air power. The real question is, so what?

    They’re in a fight for their lives against the most barbaric theocratic fascists imaginable. Now regarding the SNC what is it about them that makes you think they (a) represent anyone significant, and (b) represent anything democratic or inclusive? The SNC is a creature of Turkish Intelligence. The FSA for all intents and purposes does not exist as a coherent organisation. The Syrian armed opposition is now overwhelmingly Sunni Islamist. And yes they refused to recognise the Kurds’ identity, except as fellow Sunnis. See the Islamic Front’s leader here and his sectarian logic.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ydnVnr3KRnA

    Regarding Assad, Salih Muslim’s observation that Assad now has mass support among the Alawite community is no more than pure common sense. What do you think would happen to the Alawites, other Shia and Christian and Druze communities in the rebels won the war? To say that any deal without Assad would be very difficult is no more than stating the obvious.

    ‘Opposing all US interventions everywhere’ is idiocy. If US was not bombing ISIS, Kobane would have fallen. There would have been more massacres and the only attempt at building a secular and pluralist entity in Syria would be finished. That and the monster that is ISIS would have grown stronger.

    Finally, if people gave MANPADs to the rebels (as opposed to all the small arms and TOW anti-tank missiles that US, France the Gulf states and others have already funneled in) they would end up in the hands of Al Nusra, ISIS or, absolute best case scenario, the Islamic Front. What a great solution. Arming disparate Islamist militias worked so well in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

    Comment by John — January 12, 2015 @ 11:47 pm

  9. @John.I too have no problems with the YPG’s cooperation with the US air attacks for the reasons that you give. And I also don’t blame them for taking advantage of the conflict to establish control in the Kurdish areas. The problem comes with their turning their backs on the wider struggle against the regime in order to focus on their own narrow project. There is a simple equation here: no FSA offensive in Aleppo = no Rojava.The comments of Saleh Muslim (who may not speak for the PKK) did not merely state the obvious fact that Asad has large-scale support among Alawites, he asserted “All Alawites now support Assad. Insisting on a solution without Assad means the death of 2 million Alawites in the country,”Even leaving aside the hyperbolic “all”, this was simply to echo the regime’s propaganda in both content and style: that Asad (note the personalised framing of the issue) is the only thing standing between the Alawites and the Sunni hordes. Is it any wonder that many Syrian oppositionists began to feel that the PYD had more than a relationship of convenience with the regime?
    The phrase “a solution without Asad” is very ambiguous – if that means a “solution” that leaves Asad still in power then that means some form of deal which leaves the regime intact: in what way is that a solution (even from the Kurds perspective)?
    On your final point about provision of effective weaponry to the Syrian fighters: counter-factual history is alway uncertain ground, but from my understanding of the situation if this had been done at an early stage it could have had a significant impact in limiting the influence of the Islamist currents within the revolution. Even now, given that the Syrian Arab Air Force’s target of choice is civilian populations, it could have positive results. Despite all the urban myths there is no evidence of the significant leakage of weaponry from opposiition forces to ISIS.

    Comment by magpie68 — January 13, 2015 @ 3:06 pm

  10. What you say would make sense if there was wider democratic struggle going on in Syria. Maybe there was in 2011-12, but there certainly isn’t now. The alternatives now are; regime, Sunni Islamists and, in their areas, the Kurds (and PYD for now is the only Kurdish game in town).

    The PYD /YPG are making whatever alliances best serve their cause. Yes there are PKK-regime links, but there are also FSA affiliated militias fighting with YPG in Kobane.

    Re leakage of weaponry’, I’m sorry that’s nonsense. If only because so many Islamic Front, former FSA and Al Nusra militias have gone over to ISIS, taking their weapons with them. But even if there wasn’t the ‘mainstream’ rebels, who have certainly been armed from outside would not be acceptable to minorities, or for that matter secular Syrians either. The last thing anyone needs is giving them opportunity to shoot down airplanes.

    I do accept your point that there is long term contradiction between Kurdish or PYD aims and a restoration of the regime. If the regime won the war they would seek to dissolve the Kurdish cantons and the YPG would have to fight them. The only interim solution I can think of is ‘conflict freeze’ proposed by the UN where there’s a ceasefire based on current frontlines. Problem is that ISIS, Al Nusra and the other extremist Islamist factions will never accept it. And it would leave the ISIS ‘caliphate’ in place.

    Comment by John — January 13, 2015 @ 9:13 pm

  11. The only interim solution I can think of is ‘conflict freeze’ proposed by the UN where there’s a ceasefire based on current frontlines. Problem is that ISIS, Al Nusra and the other extremist Islamist factions will never accept it.

    Well, the obvious solution to that is for the Baathists to cut off their water so that the takfiris will come to their senses.


    Comment by louisproyect — January 13, 2015 @ 9:24 pm

  12. @John A quick response to your points. Its a common claim that the spirit of 2011 has been extinguished in Syria – but its quite wrong: the original democratic inspiration has been dispersed and overshadowed, but its far from eliminated. There are forms of civilian self-organisation in most opposition communities: how do you think the east Ghouta towns coped with the chemical weapons attack, a disaster that would have overwhelmed our emergency services under similar circumstances? Who do you thinnk provides emergency services and arranges food distributions in the face of daily aerial bombardment? Then you have the range of people outside the country – in the camps or in exile, who have developed a veritable explosion of cultural resistance including opposition radio stations covering virtually all of Syria. There are still significant components of the armed resistance who have not bought into the salafist agenda – who do you think went to Kobane to support the Kurds at a time when Aleppo was facing an imminent regime offensive? And the salafist wing is far from homogenous or, apart from Jabhat al Nusra, committed to a clear model of what an Islamic state would look like. Why do you think they oppose ISIS ?
    The “nonsense” on the issue of weapons leakage is in your court. There is only one FSA unit that has crossed over to ISIS – unfortunately one with a high profile commander (Imad Jomaa) and in a strategic area: but it involves the grand total of 150 fighters. The western media has been predicting a Jabhat al-Nusra / ISIS reconciliation for months but it hasn’t happened, and to my knowledge there have been no Jabhat al Nusra units going over to ISIS, despite the American bombing attacks.
    The idea of a “conflict freeze” is unlikely to gain any traction while the regime continues to besiege and bombard civilian populations.

    Comment by magpie68 — January 13, 2015 @ 11:58 pm

  13. You’re kidding yourself. Simple as that. Good luck to you.

    Re the the FSA-aligned militia in Kobane, they fled from Raqqa because it was taken over by ISIS, they didn’t come from Aleppo.

    Comment by John — January 14, 2015 @ 6:41 pm

  14. For those interested, here’s some pages of links to tons of articles on the Rojava revolution:

    Help build a Rojava Wiki

    ‘Rojava revolution’ reading guide

    Resources on the Rojava revolution in West Kurdistan (Syria)

    Comment by oa — January 15, 2015 @ 4:14 pm

  15. @John – I’ll concede that I am being optimistic but there’s no self-kidding going on. Here are some Syrian civic activists from the Damascus countryside demonstrating (under the shadow of the Syrian airforce) against Jabhat al Nusra because of the latter’s divisive behaviour. Reports are that JaN has withdrawn from the town. Not bad for people who according to you don’t exist. https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=npmQ5moTEUM

    Only one section of the FSA forces in Kobane came from Raqqa – the majority came from Aleppo (including the Kurdish Jabhat al-Akrad.) I’ve watched the video of them arriving in Kobane and the press conference given by their commander. You really should keep up.

    Comment by magpie68 — January 15, 2015 @ 8:36 pm

  16. […] so that ISIS could be blasted to smithereens. In keeping with its hostility to the FSA, Jacobin ran an article about Kobane that drew a distinction between the Kurdish fighters and the FSA that was a tool of Western […]

    Pingback by Patrick Higgins’s war on the truth | Louis Proyect: The Unrepentant Marxist — August 29, 2015 @ 6:19 pm

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